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TIBET AN ETHNONATIONALISM AND INTERNA-
TIONAL POLITICS 
June Teufel Dreyer 
University of Miami 
~ and ~ International Community 
Landlocked and containing the world's highest mountain 
range and its surrounding windswept plateau, Tibet has until 
recently been one of the most isolated regions on earth. Widely 
known for the majestic beauty of its scenery and the mystic 
attractions of its lamaist Buddhist religion, the Kingdom of 
Shangri-la had actually been visited by very few outsiders. Most 
of these were devout pilgrims or, as the nineteenth century wore 
on, a small number of intrepid western explorers. Though cer-
tainly not xenophobic or hostile to individual foreigners, most 
Tibetans had little interest in the world beyond their country's 
somewhat ill defined borders, preferring to keep that world and its 
influences at a distance. 
The internationalization of the status of Tibet may be 
considered to have occurred in three phases. The first began in the 
late nineteenth century, when an expanding czarist Russian empire 
began to draw closer to Britain's Indian empire. British statesmen 
came to the conclusion that a buffer state would provide a 
convenient shield against this expansion. Tibet, by reason of its 
geographic location, and because its population was culturally, 
religiously, ethnically, and linguistically distinct from that of 
China, which claimed suzerainty over it, was a logical choice. 
British diplomats began to negotiate with the Qing, or 
Manchu, dynasty that then ruled China. In 1893, as a preliminary 
step, they concluded with the Chinese government a trade treaty 
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involving Tibet. The Tibetans, however, refused to honor the 
treaty, since they had not themselves been a party to it. Britain next 
tried direct negotiations with Tibet, but these were also rebuffed 
by the government of the God-king, the Dalai Lama, on the 
grounds that the imperial government in Beijing would not allow 
it. 
Diplomatic methods having failed, Britain dispatched a 
military expedition under Colonel Francis Younghusband. The 
Tibetan army had purposely been kept weak to avoid tipping the 
domestic balance of power against the influential monastic sec-
tor, and despite the country's rugged terrain and harsh climate, 
Younghusband 's force took Tibet's capital, Lhasa, without undue 
difficulty. 
Qing officials, in what later proved to be a serious blunder, 
decided to hold the Dalai Lama responsible for this defeat and 
declared him deposed. Initially annoyed with the British, the 
Tibetans became infuriated with the Qing for what they regarded 
as egregious interference in their internal affairs. Since the God-
king holds his position not as an official with duties to perform, but 
as the reincarnation of a certain Living Buddha, the only way he 
can legitimately be deposed is by declaring him a false reincarna-
tion. This would have to be done by the appropriate Tibetan 
religious authorities, which the Qing officials clearly were not. 
Hence, the court's decree was ignored. A further consequence of 
the blunder was to convince the shrewd and highly competent 
Dalai Lama that a degree of cooperation with Britain would 
enhance his chances of survival. Trade with India grew, British 
advisers were welcomed in Lhasa, and the Tibetan government 
began to insist that when the representative of the Qing requested 
an audience, the British consul be present as well. The 1911 
revolution that toppled the Qing dynasty enabled the Tibetans to 
rid themselves of the Chinese presence, on the grounds that their 
association had been with a particular dynasty, and a non-Han 
Chinese dynasty at that, rather than with the state itself. Tibetan 
independence was never officially accepted by the Republican 
government of China,2though it was too weak to exercise actual 
administration over the territory. Just on the verge of formalizing 
the status of the buffer state it had so long sought, Britain became 
absorbed in World War I. The difficulties of the post-war period 
and the increasing certainty that India would attain independence 
combined to diminish Foreign Office interest in formally severing 
Tibet from a China that did not control it anyway. A few individu-
als, some with official positions, retained their interest in the 
country. Basically, however, the newly independent India be-
came the legatee of the Tibetan cause. 
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The second stage in the internationalization of the 
Tibet question may be considered to have begun with the Chinese 
Communist conquest of the country in October 1950. By actually 
asserting control over Tibet and announcing its intention to 
eventually make drastic changes in the area's political, social and 
economic systems, the People's Republic of China (PRC) galva-
nized a number of international forces. Understandably, these 
were most prominent in Tibet's nearest neighbor. Indian diplo-
mats worried that China would use Tibet as a forward area from 
which to press territorial claims; Indian business interests feared 
interruption in trade routes, and Indian religious leaders were 
concerned about the fate of their lamaist Buddhist colleagues. 
World anti-communist forces, most vocally those in the United 
States, lamented the loss of yet another area to the Marxist-
Leninist conspiracy. The defeated Nationalist (KMT) govern-
ment of China, which had fled to Tai wan, was also concerned with 
developments in Tibet. Although one of the few things the KMT 
and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) agree on is that Tibet is 
part of China, the KMT understandably also wished to weaken its 
communist adversary wherever it could. 
The intelligence agencies of the US, India, and Taiwan all 
appear to have been active in Tibet, providing arms, money, and 
training to anti-communist Tibetan guerrillas. Since most were 
from the Kham region, they were collectively known as the 
Khambas. Typically, these fighters were hardy merchants whose 
caravans had legitimate reasons for travelling throughout the 
country. Familiar with the terrain, accustomed to strenuous activ-
ity at high altitudes, and with good contacts among the people, 
they effectively turned Mao Zedong's military advice that "the 
army is the fish and the people are the water; the water will support 
the fish" against the communist troops. One source estimates that 
by 1959, 42,000 Khamba guerrillas were being funded by the US 
Central Intelligence Agency. He describes their major activity as 
mining the roads between Tibet and China proper. 
Meanwhile, the CCP government attempted to assert its 
jurisdiction over the area. Both from its own point of view and by 
comparison with the many changes it made in China proper during 
this period, the CCP could not be accused of wielding a heavy 
hand in the area it later designated the Tibet Autonomous Region 
(TAR) from 1950 through 1958. It did, however, attempt reforms 
in other areas inhabited by Tibetans which aroused significant 
resistance. It also made a number of decisions that created tension 
with Tibetans regardless of their place of residence. 
Among the most noteworthy of these was to expand the 
administrative jurisdiction of Qinghai province to include several 
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so-called autonomous Tibetan prefectures. As these territories 
were contiguous to the area that the CCP designated the Tibetan 
Autonomous Region, and had been considered by Tibetans as the 
country's Amdo province, the action was criticized as a "divide 
and rule" tactic. So also was the creation of comparable Tibetan 
autonomous areas in Sichuan province. Chinese anthropologists' 
"discovery" of two additional minority ethnic groups, the Loba 
and the Monba, within the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) 
was similarly construed as an effort at dividing and weakening. 
The Chinese also proved adept at exploiting already existing 
cleavages within Tibetan society, for example between the secu-
lar nobility and the monastic hierarchy, and between the wealthy 
and the poor, to their own advantage. In this instance, of course, 
the term "divide and rule" is somewhat misleading: the Chinese 
did not create the divisions, but rather cleverly manipulated them 
to serve Party policy. 
A road-building program also proved highly unpopular: 
most Tibetans did not regard highway construction as a beneficial 
upgrade for the infrastructure, but instead saw the project as 
creating smooth paths for an invasion of unwanted Chinese 
immigrants, bureaucrats, and soldiers. Moreover, while Party 
propaganda regularly railed out against the burdensome corvee 
labor arrangement required by the traditional system, Tibetans 
found themselves "volunteered" for road construction duties by 
their Chinese mentors. 
A number of other tensions were unintended. The Chinese 
People's Liberation Army (PLA)'s need to obtain food supplies 
locally created food shortages and inflationary pressures in a 
society that had heretofore been insulated from both. PLA mess 
units stationed at Lhasa regularly burned bones, as well as other 
remnants of food, as part of their regular sanitation procedures, 
not realizing that this offended Tibetan religious beliefs. For their 
part, the Chinese were horrified at many Tibetan practices. So-
called sky burial, in which corpses were exposed to be picked 
clean by vultures, contrasted sharply with Chinese notions of 
reverence toward deceased ancestors. Frugal Chinese were also 
horrified to discover that more than half of Tibet's butter produc-
tion was burned as incense in the temples. Moreover, olfactory 
senses that associated the scent of sandlewood and burning joss 
sticks with religious ceremonies found the odor of burning rancid 
butter difficult to get used to. 
While some Tibetans proved successful collaborators, 
and found their lives materially enriched because of it, a much 
larger number regarded the Chinese as unwelcome imperialists 
and resisted them in various ways ranging from passive resistance 
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to armed attacks. Tensions accumulated. In 1958, Tibetan refu-
gees from outside the TAR began to arrive in Lhasa with horror 
stories of what the disastrous social experiment known as the 
Great Leap Forward had done to the rest of the country. Millions 
of people throughout China were dying of starvation and related 
diseases. In Tibetan communities, forced communization had 
been accompanied by mass arrests and the destruction of monas-
teries. Quite naturally, both the refugees and residents of the TAR 
assumed that a comparable program of reforms would soon be 
imposed there. Existing tensions were exacerbated. When, in 
March 1959, a rumor spread that the Chinese were about to kidnap 
the Dalai Lama, a major rebellion began. 
The PLA put down the rebellion with relative ease, though 
scattered resistance continued for a long time thereafter, and the 
fact that the uprising occurred at all was a severe embarrassment 
to the Chinese government. The PRC had been touting the 
relevance of the Chinese path to socialism as a model for the non-
Han Chinese societies of the developing world, whereas the 
implied message of the revolt was that a large number of Tibetans 
were extremely unhappy with it. Party propaganda had in fact 
portrayed the Tibetan people as pathetically grateful for Chinese 
beneficence in providing them with roads, schools, and modem 
medicine. 
The CCP declared that the revolt had been caused by a 
small number of disgruntled aristocrats and religious figures who 
had "hoodwinked" the masses into participating and abducted the 
Dalai Lama. It also judged that the revolt had ended an agreement 
made with the Tibetan government in 1951, and began an ambi-
tious reform program. One important effect of the revolt was to 
end the special treatment promised, albeit on a temporary basis 
only, to Tibet, and to facilitate Tibet's integration into the regular 
administrative system of China. This did not, of course, guarantee 
that the area would become integrated into China in the more 
important psychological sense. 
Another important consequence of the 1959 revolt was 
that it created a Tibetan diaspora. At least 80,000 refugees-out 
of a total population estimated at about 4.5 million, and including 
the Dalai Lama himself-made their way out of the country, 
bringing vivid accounts of the hardships of life under Chinese 
colonialism that were highlighted by the world media. The Dalai 
Lama and a majority of these refugees settled in India, with 
sizeable groups also in Nepal and Bhutan. International refugee 
organizations arranged for small groups to settle in several other 
countries, including, among others, Switzerland, Canada, and the 
United States. Others made their way to Taiwan. From these 
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bases, the same people who had tried to keep the world at bay 
proved immensely skillful at attracting world attention to their 
cause. Hence, 1959 may be considered to mark the beginning of 
the third phase of the internationalization of the Tibetan question. 
The Tibetan Government-in-Exile set up representative 
offices cultural and administrative capitals of the world, and 
began to lobby for the cause of Tibet. Typically, these publish 
newsletters summarizing developments in Tibet. 4 There are also 
international monthlies, the Tibetan Review and Tibetan Bulletin, 
which deal with various aspects of traditional religion and culture 
and give news on the activities of the various diaspora communi-
ties as well as chronicling events in Tibetan areas under PRC 
control. An international Tibet Press Watch compiles data on 
news concerning Tibet from the world media. Since adherents of 
many faiths can be assumed to have sympathy for those of other 
faiths who are being oppressed, Tibetan Buddhists have set up 
contacts with other religious communities. Such groups have 
been instrumental in having the Dalai Lama or his representatives 
invited to their countries to speak. The Chinese government is 
strongly opposed to such visits. 
Tibetan efforts received a setback in the 1970s when most 
of the international community began to seek betterrelations with 
the PRC. The US ceased its support of the Khamba guerrillas, 
many of whom were summarily executed. It, and other countries 
as well, began to give more consideration to China's attitude 
toward Tibet. The PR C's protests and vague but strongly-worded 
threats of retaliation have intimidated all but a handful of world 
leaders from receiving the Dalai Lama. Most governments have, 
however, been willing to agree to an unofficial visit from His 
_Holiness in order to confer privately (though typically attended 
by much publicity) with interested groups. These have included, 
among others, universities with religious study programs, Bud-
dhist associations who express the desire to discuss fine points of 
theology, and Jewish groups who wish to conduct an inter-faith 
dialogue. An ongoing subject of discussion with obvious mutual 
interest between the Dalai Lama and world Jewish communities 
concerns the matter of how an exile group maintains its cultural 
and religious identity many centuries after leaving its homeland. 5 
While Tibet's international status is not the topic of His Holiness's 
speech, the issue is almost invariably raised in the question and 
answer session, and is addressed. Jewish groups have been strongly 
supportive of Tibet: for example, during the summer of 1990, the 
Central Conference of American Rabbis passed a resolution 
condemning the PRC for its treatment of Tibetans, urged Presi-
dent Bush to invite His Holiness to the White House, and asked 
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Congress to pass a bill granting permanent visas to a thousand 
Tibetans. 6 
Exile leaders have also sought to attract attention to 
Tibet' scause by enhancing the world's awareness of their country's 
distinctive culture. New York's Tibet House, for example, spon-
sors art exhibitions and conferences. Tibetan paintings have 
toured major museums of the world, and Tibet handicrafts shops 
sell such items as traditional carpets, fabrics, and jewelry. Several 
publication houses specialize in books dealing with Tibet, carry-
ing titles on topics including traditional medicine, religion, and art 
as well as politics . While Tibetan leaders would deny that there is 
a public relations motive behind these ventures, they have indeed 
served to draw attention to the area's plight. A number of promi-
nent people have become activists in support of Tibet, including 
American film actor Richard Gere and German Green Party leader 
Petra Kelly. 
These efforts to call attention to the cause of Tibet have 
been helped by the PRC's lack of success in administering the 
region. The reform policies imposed after the 1959 rebellion 
included the wholesale destruction of most monasteries and the 
arrival of a large number of Han Chinese administrators who 
neither knew the country nor appeared interested in remedying 
this deficiency. Most immigrant Chinese seemed to ignore the 
CCP's orders to learn Tibetan. The Cultural Revolution, which 
began in 1966, was a particularly devastating experience in Tibet. 
While most of the actual fighting appears to have occurred 
between different factions of Han Chinese Red Guards rather than 
direct! yin vol vin~ Tibetans, there was great destruction to temples 
and monasteries. By September 1966, the official Xinhua news 
agency reported that the prayer flags that formerly flew from 
Lhasa roofs had all been replaced by the five-star Chinese flag, 
and that walls and household shrines now contained images of 
Chairman Mao Zedong rather than "superstitious" pictures. 8 
In the 1970s, a more benign policy toward China's ethnic 
minorities in general allowed Tibetans as well as others more 
freedoms. But an effort to force Tibetans to grow wheat rather than 
the traditional barley backfired badly. Touted as a way of raising 
crop yields, it was perceived by many Tibetans as forcing them to 
raise an unwanted commodity in order to feed more Han immi-
grants. Wheat proved to be unsuitable ecologically as well as 
culturally: after a few years of apparently good results, the soil 
became exhausted. Crops failed disastrously in the late 1970s, to 
the extent that in 1980 Han immigrants were evacuated because 
of the food shortage. 9 
The government reversed its wheat policy, allowing Ti-
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betans to raise barley again. It also ended the commune system, 
resulting in increases in agriculture and livestock production. 
Rural discontents were reduced, although urban dissatisfactions 
continued to grow. A number of factors were involved, only a few 
of which space permits to be mentioned here. 1° First, in order to 
encourage Han to come to Tibet and contribute their skills to the 
area's development, the government paid them salary supple-
ments. This created a two-tier wage scale that disadvantaged local 
people and created jealousy. Second, Tibetans complained that 
Han received preferential treatment in hiring and promotions. 
Tourism presented other, more complicated problems. 
The Chinese government has encouraged tourism as a 
relatively easy way to enhance its foreign exchange holdings, and 
Tibet, though an expensive destination, has had considerable 
appeal for foreign visitors. Some Tibetans welcomed the visitors, 
and prospered by selling items such as ceremonial scarves and dis-
tinctively Tibetan jewelry made of coral, turquoise, and silver. 
Others viewed tourism as one more example of Tibet's exploita-
tion by the Chinese, feeling that it was the Han rather than the 
locals that profited from it. In the words of one native, 
First the Chinese cut our trees, mined our 
gold, and took our grain. Now there's nothing left, 
and they're selling our country to the foreigners. 11 
Foreign tourists report being approached by Tibetans who 
wished to complain about their treatment by the Chinese, and who 
begged them not for money, but for pictures of the Dalai Lama. A 
number of the tourists had come because of a prior interest in 
Tibetan culture and religion, and were therefore predisposed 
toward sympathy with the local people. Various forms of collu-
sion developed, including the smuggling in ofreligious tracts, and 
the smuggling out of letters to Western human rights groups. 
Demonstrations of varying sizes were endemic; at least one 
tourist, a Dutch human rights advocate, was shot by Chinese 
police as she marched with the protestors. 
In March 1989, on the thirtieth anniversary of the 1957 
rebellion, a demonstration turned particularly brutal, with 450 
Tibetans killed and thousands more arrested. The TAR was placed 
under martial law for over a year. An eyewitness to the demonstra-
tion reported that he and approximately a hundred other tourists 
had been expelled from Lhasa so that there could be no outside 
corroboration for the retaliation that the PLA and police were 
about to take. 12 During the following year, a defecting Han Xinhua 
correspondant presented evidence that the demonstration had in 
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fact been incited by a~ents provocateurs acting on instructions 
from Beijing. 13 
In sum, the record of Chinese administration in Tibet has 
given the region's refugee lobbyists a long grievance list with 
which to attract international attention. 
Demands 
Independence from Chinese rule has been the consistent 
demand of Tibetan expatriate communities, as well as anti-
Chinese activists within Tibet. 14Some individuals have occasion-
ally intimated that they might be willing to define independence 
in a manner that did not imply complete and total separation from 
Chinese rule. If the region were to truly be given the autonomy 
implied in its designation as an autonomous region, many Tibet-
ans would probably be mollified. Foreign sources have suggested 
that Tibet be re-designated a Special Administrative Region 
(SAR), a classification written into the PRC's 1982 constitution 
in order to facilitate the re-integration of Hong Kong, Macao, and 
Taiwan with the People's Republic. This plan was not well 
received by Tibetans, and received an unequivocal rejection from 
the Beijing government. The latter declared that the status of Tibet 
had been fixed by treaty many years ago, and was not subject to 
re-negotiation. 
In June, 1988, during an address to the European Parlia-
ment at Strasbourg, the Dalai Lama outlined the framework for a 
Hong Kong style settlement. The key points were: 
- Beijing would be responsible for Tibet's foreign policy; 
- Tibet would be governed by its own constitution or basic 
law; 
- the Tibetan government would comprise a popularly 
elected chief executive, a bicameral legislature, and an 
in dependent legal system; 
- Ti bet would become a demilitarized zone, but with China 
retaining the right to maintain military installations in 
Tibet for defensive purposes only, until neutral 
ity is established. 15 
Most outside observers found the Strasbourg statement 
constructive, noting that for the first time, the Dalai Lama had 
formally asked for an arrangement short of total independence. 16 
Most Tibetans, and most vocally the younger generation thereof, 
did not approve of the statement, and pressed for immediate and 
complete independence with no conditions attached. The Chinese 
leadership accused the Dalai Lama of trying to internationalize 
what was actually an entirely domestic matter. They credited the 
proposal with "a change in tone," though rejecting it as tanta-
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mount to a declaration of independence or semi-independence, 
neither of which was acceptable. 
The Dalai Lama was, however, invited to Beijing for 
negotiations. 17 The Dalai Lama agreed to negotiate, but wished to 
do so at a location outside of China. PRC leaders initially seemed 
cool to the idea, but in September 1988 agreed to allow the Dalai 
Lama to choose the site. 18 However, the Chinese side then refused 
to accept as part of the Tibetan negotiating team a Dutch lawyer 
who had worked with the exile government for many years. The 
Dalai Lama's group countered by saying that the attorney, a 
specialist in international law, was an adviser to, rather than a 
member of, the negotiating team. 
At this point, a Hong Kong newspaper reported that 
younger Tibetan radicals, frustrated at the lack of progress on the 
part of the Dalai Lama's government, and by the Indian 
government's neutral stance, began to urge a global terror cam-
paign. This would include bombing PRC embassies, assassinat-
ing high-ranking Chinese leaders, and hijacking the mainland's 
planes. When reminded that the religion and its leader, in whose 
names they acted, consistently preached non-violence, the radi-
cals replied that they saw independence as a strictly political issue 
which should not be compromised by religion. 19 While Tibetan 
sources have criticized this news report as greatly exaggerated, 
the existence of a substantial number of younger Tibetan radicals 
is not denied. China responded to this news by intensifying its 
efforts to find pronationalist leaders and put them in jail. 20 
The atmosphere surrounding the consultations about 
negotiations was further clouded in January 1989, by the death of 
Tibet's second highest reincarnation, the Panchen Lama. He had 
not left the country after the 1959 rebellion, and had had a good, 
though not completely unblemished, record ofloyalty to whatever 
the Party line happened to be at any given moment. It was 
therefore shocking when, at a ceremonial occasion on January 24, 
he stated that, although there had been development in Tibet since 
its liberation by the CCP, this development had been outweighed 
by what it had cost. 21 Xinhua subsequently announced that he had 
died on January 28, of a heart attack. 22 Since the lama was only 51, 
had no previous history of heart disease, and was survived by both 
his parents as well as numerous siblings, suspicious minds con-
cluded he had been murdered in retaliation for his outspoken-
ness.23 
It is impossible to substantiate these charges, and the truth 
may never be known. What is certain is that the Panchen Lama's 
death deepened the atmosphere of distrust between Tibet and 
China, and deprived the Chinese government of an important 
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conduit to the Dalai Lama. When Tibet was placed under martial 
law after the apparently Beijing-contrived rebellion of March 
1989, the possibility of successful negotiations became still more 
remote. The Tiananmen incident in June provided yet another 
obstacle. As of early 1991, no meaningful progress had been 
made. 
Resolution 
The prospects forresolution of the Tibetan question do not 
look bright. While the plight of the Tibetans has aroused world 
sympathy, no major foreign government has been willing to 
jeopardize its good relations with China in order to actively 
support the Tibetan cause. Their attitude did not alter either after 
the PRC government moved violently against Chinese demon-
strators in Tiananmen Square in June of 1989, or after the Dalai 
Lama was awarded the 1989 Nobel Peace Prize. 
In August 1990, the Dalai Lama announced that the 
continued existence of the institution of Dalai Lama would be up 
to the Tibetan people, and that he was willing to give up his 
demand for an independent Tibet and settle for autonomy within 
China. He called talk of complete independence "a little unrealis-
tic," though admitting this view would be unpopular with his 
followers. 24 Indeed it has been. A factor further complicating the 
difficulties of finding a negotiated settlement to the Tibet question 
is the rise of a new generation of militants, both within the TAR 
and in the various exile communities. While their reverence for 
the Dalai Lama is sincere, they apparently find no inconsistency 
between these professions of unswerving devotion and their 
rejection of the Dalai Lama's message of non-violence. Even 
were the Beijing government inclined to compromise-which 
thusfar it has not been-the compromise might not be acceptable 
to a sufficient number of Tibetans. Democratization has affected 
the Tibetan exile community to a significant degree: as of May 
1990, for example, the Tibetan cabinet is now selected through 
popular election. Compliance with the Dalai Lama's wishes 
cannot be taken for granted. Moreover, people accustomed to 
speaking their minds freely and choosing their own officials will 
find it difficult to re-integrate themselves into a Tibet ruled by the 
current Chinese government. 
The Dalai Lama has viewed developments in the Soviet 
Union and Eastern Europe as a possible precursorofliberalization 
in China, in which case a settlement might be possible. Chinese 
dissidents who fled to the West after the Tiananmen incident have 
in fact suggested that, under a democratic government, China 
could become a federation of five parts, including the mainland, 
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Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao, and Tibet; each would have its own 
seat in the UN.25 The advent of a democratic China is, of course, 
a rather large conditfon to the fruition of this plan. Moreover, even 
a popularly elected Chinese government might not be willing to 
let Tibet go its own way. 
In the short term, at least, a more plausible scenario is the 
emergence of a Northern Ireland-like situation, in which religious 
festivals or the anniversaries of previous uprisings become the 
occasions for outpourings of popular discontent. Each new upris-
ing has the potential to provide more martyrs to the cause, and 
avenging the honor of the martyrs will provide the reason for 
future uprisings in Tibet. These will generate considerable sym-
pathy from the international community, but no foreign govern-
ment is apt to make any serious effort to influence China to loosen 
its hold over the region. 
What China gets out of its occupation of Tibet is not 
immediately clear. There is undoubtedly a strong nationalistic 
motive: the PRC has maintained the southwestern boundaries of 
the Qing dynasty Chinese empire. Certainly the motivation for its 
continued presence is not economic. While Tibet contains ura-
nium and other valuable minerals, they are not easily accessible. 
The TAR has since its inception been a substantial drain on the 
central government treasury, and the situation is getting worse 
rather than better. A 1985 article in one of the PRC' s leading 
economic journals noted that money invested in Tibet did not have 
a multiplier effect. An increase of one Ylliill in output value 
required an input of 1.21 Yllil!lin state subsidies. Over the previous 
thirty years, the average increase in output value in the TAR had 
been 5.45%, while the average annual increase in state subsidies 
was nearly 15%. Tibet was in fact becoming~ dependent on 
state subsidies rather than less.26 
China does, of course, have a legitimate security interest 
in protecting its southwestern borders, but with Sino-Soviet 
relations and Sino-Indian relations so much improved, the contin-
ued stationing of troops estimated from a low of 50,000 troops to 
a high of 250,000 in the TAR would seem unnecessarily expen-
sive from a defensive point of view. A more convincing argument 
for the PRC government's refusal to compromise on Tibet is that 
it fears the demonstration effect: granting independence, or even 
meaningful autonomy, to Tibet might well prompt similar, or 
even more far-reaching, demands from China's other minority 
groups. Some of their areas, such as the already restive Xinjiang 
Uighur Autonomous Region, are potentially very wealthy, and 
their resources are more easily tapped than those of Tibet. The 
problems that contentious ethnic minorities, rich or poor, can pose 
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for the central government have been amply demonstrated in the 
Soviet Union in recent years. 
It is not completely out of the question that a future Beijing 
government may come to the conclusion that granting a degree of 
internal self-government to Tibet would be preferable to continu-
ing to sustain a financial black hole which is simultaneously an 
acute human rights embarrassment. At that point, it will become 
a question of whether the Dalai Lama can persuade his militant 
supporters to agree to such a compromise. 
FOOTNOTES 
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